• Gender and Voting Behaviour

 Click here for Guardian article on Gender and Voting NEW link added February 2013

Click here for a different view from Peter Kellner of You Gov on Gender and Voting Behaviour NEW link added February 20th 2013

 

[ On March 16th 2012 I have modified this section of the notes to take account of differences in the definition and measurement of the gender gap and to include some information on the effects of inter-relationships between gender, age and social class on voting behaviour. In this latest revision of this section I now rely primarily on the IPSOS MORI data on gender and voting behaviour which can be found on the IPSOS MORI site and also in successive IPSOS MORI studies of the General Elections of 1997, 2001, 2005 and 2010. ]

The measurement of the gender gap can present some problems but students may find the  IPSOS MORI summary presentation of the data especially useful especially for examination purposes.

You may also  for click here for BBC Analysis Programme [about 25 minutes] on Gender and Voting Behaviour.

• This section of the notes now divided into four parts.

1. The Basic Trends in the Relationships between Gender and Voting Behaviour 1974 [Oct] -2010.

2. Data on Gender and Voting Behaviour 1974 [Oct] - 2001

3. Data on Gender and Voting Behaviour in 2005 and 2010.

4. Some Further Information [via external links ] on Gender and Voting Behaviour in 2010. 

 

• The Basic Trends in the Relationships between Gender and Voting Behaviour 1974 [Oct] -2010.

1. The gender Gap may be calculated in two different ways; The Female- Male- Gender Gap in Conservative Voting and the Male -Female Gender gap in Conservative voting. These gaps have the same values but with different signs. This seems clear enough but by analogy if you imagine two individuals X and Y who weigh 15  stone and 11stone respectively the X-Y "weight gap"  is 4 stone and the Y-X "weight gap" is -4stone. [In principle similar gender gaps in Labour voting could also be calculated]

2. The Female-Male Gender gap is calculated as [% Female Con Vote- % Female Lab Vote] minus [% Male Con Vote -% Male Lab Vote].

3. The Male-Female Gender Gap is Calculated as [% Male Con Vote- % Male Lab Vote] minus [% Female Con Vote- % Female Lab Vote].

4. On the basis of the IPSOS MORI data [see below]  the Female-Male Gender Gap changed from +12 to -5 between 1974[Oct] and 2010 illustrating that between these dates women became decreasingly pro-Conservative/increasingly pro-Labour by comparison with men.

5. Analogously the Male-Female Gender Gap changed from -12 to +5 indicating that between these dates men became increasingly pro-Conservative/ decreasingly pro-Labour by comparison with men.

6. However IPSOS MORI present these data slightly differently  noting that there was a positive Female-Male Gender Gap between 1974 [Oct] and 2001 and a positive Male-Female Gender Gap in 2005 and 2010 [See Below].

7. There are also important interconnections between gender, age and voting behaviour. Between 1974[Oct ] and 2001 even though the overall positive gender gap indicated that women overall were relatively pro-Conservative/ anti Labour by comparison with men negative Female-Male Gender Gaps among young voters indicated that young women  were less pro- Conservative/more pro-Labour than young men.

8. As noted in point 6 IPSOS MORI present the 2005 and 2010 data as indicating a Positive Male-Female Gap .

9. This positive Male-Female gender gap was even greater among voters 18-24 and 25-34 in 2005 and among voters 25-34 [but not 18-24]  in 2010 indicating that male voters in these age groups at these times were specially pro-Conservative /anti-Labour by comparison with female voters in these age groups. 

10. There are also important interconnections between gender, social class and voting behaviour. These are illustrated below.

• Region and Voting Behaviour

Click here for the BBC's Map of the 2001 General Election Results

Click here for the BBC's Map of the 2005 General Election Results

Click here for the BBC's Map of the 2010 General Election Results

Click here for a Guardian article on Region and Voting Behaviour in January 2012

You may click here  for the most recent regularly updated information on Region and Voting Behaviour from the monthly Ipsos Mori Political Monitor

Voters in Scotland, Wales and the more northerly regions of Great Britain have traditionally more likely to vote Labour than Conservative  partly because there have traditionally been larger percentages of working class voters in these areas and because in areas of high working class concentration the likelihood that working class voters will in fact vote Labour tends to be greater. It has been noted elsewhere that the linkages between social class and voting behaviour have tended to weaken especially since the 1960s but it has also been argued that there are good reasons to believe that this process of class dealignment may be stronger in the South of England than in Northern England, Scotland and Wales.

The following data illustrate regional differences in voting behaviour between 1997 and 2010. They have been collated from successive House of Commons Library Research Papers on the General Elections of 1997, 2001, 2005 and 2010. {Notice that I have included the SNP and PC votes as percentages of the Scottish and Welsh votes respectively but have not included the SNP and PC votes as percentages of the GB and UK votes; neither have I included data on votes for other UK parties nor on the vote shares of the Northern Irish parties. Interested students may consult the original sources for these data. ] 

Percentage Vote Shares of Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats, SNP and PC 1997-2010

With regard to the General Elections of 1997, 2001 , 2005 and 2010 if we compare the General Election results of 1997 and 2010 we may note the following main regional trends

• Notice that in each of the 4  General Elections English voters have been more pro-Conservative and less pro-Labour than Scottish and Welsh voters.

• However note that in both 1997 and 2001 English voters were nevertheless more likely to vote Labour than to vote Conservative. In 2005 and 2010 the reverse was the case.

• Labour's large 1997 leads over the Conservatives in the North East, the North West and Yorkshire and Humberside diminished substantially by 2010.

• The East Midlands and the West Midlands  were pro-Labour in 1997 but pro-Conservative in 2010.

• London was strongly pro-Labour in 1997 but only narrowly pro-Labour in 2010.

• The Conservatives' 1997 lead over Labour in the East ,the South East and the South West increased considerably by 2010.

• Between 1997 and 2010 there was little overall change in Labour's lead over the Conservatives in Scotland.

• Support for Labour actually increased between 2005 and 2010: the only Country/region where this occurred. Reasons included Gordon Brown's Scottishness, the fact that the Liberal Democrats had discarded two Scottish leaders and the possibility that  the SNP rather than the Labour Government received more blame for economic difficulties in Scotland. Notice also that David Cameron's strategy seemed to fall on many deaf ears in Scotland.

• Support for Labour in Wales declined very considerably between 1997 and 2010 and the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats gained approximately equally as  a result of the decline in Labour's support .

• Liberal Democrat support in creased between 1997 in all of the English Regions and in Scotland and Wales . However interestingly, the increase in Liberal Democrat support was smallest in the South West which has traditionally been the area most strongly in support of the Liberal Democrats leading to speculation that Liberal Democrat support may have peaked , at least temporarily in the South West.

• The final row of the second table provides a measure of regional variation  [RV] in voting behaviour in the general elections of 2005 and 2010.  For each main  political party the RV statistic  shows the percentage difference in voter support  between the most popular region and the least popular countries/regions. You may notice for example that the regional variation in support for the  Lib Dems  is lower than for the Conservative and Labour parties and that the RV increased for the Conservative Party increased by more than the RVs for  Labour and Liberal Democrats.

Within the regions voters in conurbations and large cities have been generally more likely to vote Labour and less likely to vote Conservative than voters than voters living in small towns and rural areas and there are also additional factors relating to particular constituencies which may influence their voting patterns such that, for example constituencies with relatively high proportions of white collar workers and retired voters are relatively more Conservative while constituencies in deprived inner city areas are especially pro-Labour. [See Britain Votes 2005 edited by Pippa Norris and Christopher Wlezien for further details.]

These regional and local differences in voting behaviour have been explained primarily in terms of social class- related factors.

1. Regions and localities with relatively high concentrations of working class residents and relatively low concentrations of middle class residents are likely to generate more Labour voters simply because of the relatively large numbers of working class residents.

2. However in regions and localities of high working class concentration the strength of the political socialisation process encouraging working class voters to vote Labour is likely to be especially strong so that voting support for Labour is likely to be greater than might have been predicted from the proportions of working class and middle class residents alone and even middle class Labour voting is likely to increase in such areas.. Similar processes operate in regions and localities with high concentrations of middle class residents to increase middle class and also working class support for the Conservative Party.

• Activity: Use the above table to analyse and compare relationships between region and voting behaviour in the General Elections of  1997 and 2010

• Religion and Voting Behaviour [Data from IPSOS MORI:  results of their 2001 survey on religious affiliation and party support.]

Religion was a much more significant influence on voting behaviour in mainland Britain from the mid C19th until the early C20th when members of the Church of England were especially likely to support the Conservative Party and Catholics and Nonconformist churches were more likely to support the Liberal Party. It continues to have a very strong influence on voting behaviour in Ireland and also in certain key areas on mainland Britain such as Liverpool and Glasgow where Catholics have traditionally been out of sympathy with traditional Conservative governments' rejection of an independent united Ireland  and Protestants have supported the Conservative defence of an independent and Protestant dominated Northern Ireland. Similar views can also be found in certain key areas on mainland Britain such as Liverpool and Glasgow where religious links with Ireland may override social class loyalties and cause many working class Protestants to vote Conservative and middle class Catholics to vote Labour..

However with the rise of the Labour Party and the growth of social class based voting religion became a less important determinant of voting behaviour. Nevertheless between 1945 and 1970 Catholics  were quite significantly more likely to vote Labour and less likely to vote Conservative than supporters of he Church of England and other Protestant denominations  mainly because mainland British Catholics may often have had family connections with Ireland but also because they were more likely than Protestants to be working class so that their voting behaviour was actually explained more by their class membership than by their religion.  The following data show continuing correlations between voting behaviour and religion in 2001 but these correlations too are likely mainly to reflect the indirect influence of social class.

As is shown above ethnic minority voters [both Asian and Black] were far more likely than White voters to vote Labour and far less likely to vote Conservative in the General election of 1997. This, of course, should come as no surprise since although ethnic minority members can be found throughout the British class structure Afro-Caribbean origin and Bangladeshi and Pakistani origin people are represented disproportionately in the working class, disproportionately likely to experience poverty and also disproportionately likely to live in large conurbations where working class support for Labour is strongest. The discrepancy between Black and Asian voting can be explained at least to some extent by the more privileged situation of Indian voters relative to other ethnic minority voters.

Nevertheless in overall terms ethnic minority members in all social classes are more likely than white voters in the same social classes to vote Labour which suggests that ethnicity has an important independent effect on voting behaviour beyond what would be predicted solely by the consideration of the class situations of ethnic minority voters. Ethnic minority voters may tend to believe that even if significant patterns of ethnic disadvantage continue to exist in UK society, Labour governments have at least addressed these problems more meaningfully than have Conservative governments which, if anything are associated with the hardening of ethnic inequalities especially in the era of Thatcherism. Furthermore although ethnic minorities are heavily underrepresented among MPs in all political parties it has traditionally seemed more likely that their representation would increase faster in the Labour Party .

IPSOS MORI Estimates of Voting Behaviour in the General Election of 2005 [Click here for the  2006 Ipsos Mori paper Ethic Minority Voters and Non-Voters at the 2005 British General Election by Roger Mortimore and Kully Kaur Ballagan from  which the following data have been extracted]

	All	Caribbean	African	Indian	Bangladeshi	Pakistani	Other/Mixed
Con	10	3	2	11	9	11	13
Lab	58	80	79	56	41	50	47
Lib Dem	16	5	11	14	16	25	22
Other	4	2	1	1	21	8	5
Refused to say	12	11	7	17	13	7	12

 

The above data on the 1997 and 2005 General Elections are not fully comparable since the 1997 data are drawn from Ipsos Mori's national survey classifying ethnic minority members into  the broad Black and Asian categories while the 2005 data are drawn from a small weighted sample of 1220 ethnic minority voters who are classified into differing ethnic groups within the broader Black and Asian categories.

In the 2005 sample the percentages of Caribbean and African voters voting Labour  were only  slightly smaller than the percentage of Black voters voting Labour in the 1997 sample  whereas the percentages of Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani voters voting Labour in the 2005 sample were  considerably smaller than the percentage of Asian voters voting Labour in 1997. Support for the Conservative Party was slightly higher among all three categories of Asian voters in the 2005 sample than for Asian voters as a whole in the 1997 sample but  support for the Liberal Democrats [which opposed the Iraq War]  among all three categories of Asian voters was  significantly higher in the 2005 sample than in the 1997 sample. Bangladeshi and Pakistani voters were significantly more likely than Indian voters in the 2005 sample to support Other parties[ mainly the Respect Party which also opposed the Iraq War] but it is noticeable also that in the 2005 sample  whereas Bangladeshis were more likely to vote for Other parties than for the Liberal Democrats the reverse was the case among Pakistanis.

 Although Labour did face significant electoral difficulties in 2005 as a result of the defection from Labour of many Muslim voters as a response to the Iraq war  and to  legislation relating to asylum seekers and anti-terrorism Labour only lost one parliamentary seat [Bethnal Green and Bow] as  a result of such defections, in this case mainly to the Respect Party. In the 2005 General Election Respect fielded 26 candidates and approximately 25% of its total national votes were gained by George Galloway in Bethnal Green and Bow which, according to the 2001 Census has 35.7% of Bangladeshi residents but only 2.7% of other Asian residents  and also, at 40%, has the highest concentration of Muslim residents  of all constituencies in the UK.

Ultimately in the 2005 General Election 13 Labour ethnic minority MPs were elected compared with two Conservative ethnic minority MPS and no Liberal Democrat ethnic minority MPs . 

[I am grateful to Mr. A. Endersby of Bishop Wordsworth's School Salisbury for drawing my attention to the Ipsos Mori report on the 2005 General Election ]

When he became leader of the Conservative Party David Cameron stated that he hoped to promote the election of more Conservative BME MPs and this may have encouraged greater electoral support among BME voters [especially perhaps among Indian voters] for the Conservatives.  In the event in 2010 27 BME MPs were elected to Parliament:  16 Labour MPs , 11 Conservative MPs and zero Liberal Democrats. and so  Mr. Cameron can claim to have made some progress in this respect. Nevertheless members of BME groups are still under-represented in Parliament: at the time of the 2001 Census BME members constituted 7.9% of the UK population but only 4.2% of MPs after the 2010 General Election.  Labour regained Bethnal Green and Bow from Respect in the 2010 General Election.

It has been argued that gradual changes in the UK class structure resulting in the increased representation of ethnic minority members within the UK middle class could be expected to lead to increased support for the Conservative party especially perhaps among Indian -origin and some -African origin voters. However you may Click here for a Runnymede Trust/BES Slide Presentation on Ethnic Minority Voting in the 2010 General Election which suggests  that even though there has been some decline in Minority Ethnic support for Labour Minority Ethnic voters remained considerably more likely to vote Labour than to vote Conservative in 2010.. You may also click here for further recent survey data on ethnicity and voting behaviour in 2005 and 2010 . [Data from the Ethnic Minority British Election Survey {EMBES} as reported on the British Religion in Numbers {BRIN} website.

Click here for Lord Ashcroft's Publication [April 2012] on Ethnicity and Voting Behaviour. Lord Ashcroft is a former Deputy Chairman of the Conservative Party who has been involved heavily in the finance and organisation of previous Conservative Party election campaigns. The publication provides very detailed information on ethnic patterns of voting behaviour with the aim of devising new strategies for increasing the attractiveness of the Conservative Party to ethnic minority voters.

Click here for a fairly detailed summary  of the Lord  Ashcroft Report  written by Paul Goodman on the Conservative Home web site.

Document Summary

• The years 1945-1970 may be described reasonably as a time of two party dominance and relative electoral stability.

• Psephologists explained voting behaviour mainly in terms of the Party identification model of voting behaviour in which for most voters social class differences result in  differences in political socialisation, social class differences in party images, social class differences in party identification and social class differences in voting behaviour.

• Throughout 1945 -1970 there were fairly stable relationships between social class and voting behaviour when , on average approximately 62% of working class voters voted Labour and approximately 66% of middle class voters voted Conservative. {Percentages are own calculations  from data in How Britain Votes].

• Substantial minorities of voters did not vote predictably in accordance with their social class. They came to be described as "deviant voters" and several factors were suggested as explanations of their voting behaviour.

• Although social class was the most important determinant of voting behaviour age, gender, region, religion and ethnicity also influenced voting behaviour although in some cases social class also helped to explain the influences of these non-class factors on voting behaviour.

The relatively stable patterns of voting behaviour which existed from 1945-1970 were increasingly replaced by increasing electoral volatility leading to new theories of voting behaviour focusing on the decline of party identification [or partisan dealignment] and class dealignment . These developments will be discussed in the following document.